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21.INTRODUCTION
The case for fiscal policy co-ordination within a monetary union, as proposed
in the European context by the Maastricht agreement, remains a highly controversial
issue. Two aspects of this question can be distinguished. The first aspect is ’purely
fiscal’, arises in a non-monetary economy, and focuses on possible externalities
associated with the uncoordinated conduct of fiscal policy for a given inflation rate.
The second - our main focus - arises from the interdependence of monetary and
fiscal policy and the concern that decentralised fiscal policy will undermine the
successful conduct of a low-inflation monetary policy by the central bank.
In examining the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, a useful
point of departure is the seminal study by Sargent and Wallace (1981) of the
monetary-fiscal coordination problem which faces any central bank. Their title,
’Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic’ alludes to the fact that a central bank cannot
successfully control inflation if the fiscal authorities persist in running primary
budget deficits. More specifically they assume a quantity theory demand schedule
for money (embodying ’unadulterated monetarism’) and that the real interest rate is
constant and higher than the GDP growth rate. Government debt as a proportion of
GDP can grow until some time , after which it must be stabilised. This is achieved
by the central bank monetising the deficit. They conclude that tighter monetary
policy up to time causes higher inflation after that date.
Sargent and Wallace represent the actions of fiscal authorities as a series of
deficits excluding seigniorage. A central feature of our paper is the use of dynamic
game equilibria to characterise a number of strategic relationships between
policymakers of which ’unpleasant monetary arithmetic’ is just one possible
scenario. We follow recent approaches to macro-modelling in constructing a two-
country model of monetary union which is based on rigorous micro-foundations.
Section 2 sets out the model which consists of two economies with identical
economic structures but producing two goods which are imperfect substitutes. A
1central bank sets the common, nominal rate of interest. As an alternative to the two-
good version of monetary union we also consider the one-good case in order to
examine the implications of complete economic integration.
Section 3 sets out the game-theoretic framework in which monetary union is
a game played between two national governments, the ’fiscal authorities’, and one
central bank (CB). The possible gains from the full coordination of fiscal and
monetary policy are examined by comparing a cooperative equilibrium, in which the
global welfare function consists of the average of the three players’ individual
welfare functions, with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Similarly we examine
the gains from fiscal policy coordination alone, with an independent CB, by treating
the fiscal authorities as one coordinated player in a two-player non-cooperative
equilibrium. The emphasis is on time-consistent equilibria, but the socially optimal
regime (full cooperation between all three players where policymakers enjoy a
reputation for precommitment) provides a benchmark. Section 4 provides the main
results in the form of simulations of the calibrated model and section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. THE MODEL.
We first set out the two-good, two-country model of monetary union. Each
economy consists of a large number of competitive firms. Population and labour
supply grow at the same constant exogenous rate. The goods market clears instantly,
but unions representing ’insiders’ prevent a similar outcome in the labour market.
Nominal wage contracts provide the familiar output gains from inflation surprises.
Labour-augmenting technical change occurs at a constant exogenous rate.
Consumers’ wealth consists of government bonds issued by both domestic and
foreign governments, capital and real money balances. Government spending is
financed by borrowing, distortionary taxes and seigniorage subject to a government
solvency constraint. Domestic and overseas bonds are perfect substitutes. Time is
2discrete
1. The details of the model are as follows:
Households and Government
Each economy is composed of overlapping generations of identical
consumers, each of whom faces a constant probability p of death.(See table 2.1 for
a summary of all notation). The single-period utility function of the consumer is
logarithmic in private and public consumption and money is held for the purposes
of purchasing both domestic and imported goods. For the consumer in the
’domestic’ country, born in period s, the expected utility at time t³s, in the absence
of any uncertainty apart from death, is then given by
(2.1)
where are positive parameters satisfying . Cdi,s,C mi,s and Gi,s
denote consumption of the domestically produced good, the foreign imported good
and exhaustive government expenditure respectively, at time i. The latter is assumed
to consist of the domestic good only. Mi-1,s denotes the nominal (high-powered)
money stock at the beginning of the period i, Pt is the price of domestic output,
is the price of foreign output and q is the consumer’s pure rate of time preference.
Following Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985) and Frenkel and Razin (1987),
life-cycle aspects of labour income are ignored and household labour supply is
assumed to be fixed. Households leave no bequests or debts to their heirs. Instead,
life insurance companies inherit each consumer’s non-human wealth (or debt) and
pay out (or receive) a premium during their life-time. This latter feature of the
model together with population growth causes Ricardian equivalence to break down.
Consumers’ non-human wealth consists of government bonds issued by both
governments, capital and real money balances; i.e.,
1 Our use of discrete time follows Frenkel and Razin (1987), but differs from
much of the literature in this area which uses continuous time. This choice is not
fundamental but the dynamic game concepts turn out to be more transparent in
discrete time.
3(2.2)
where Dt,s is (non-indexed) government debt held by domestic or foreign consumers.
Ft,s is net overseas assets and Kt,s is domestic capital stock assumed to owned by
domestic residents. All assets are measured at the end of the period and are
expressed in units of domestic output. We assume the simplest residence-based tax
structure: a constant tax rate is levied on all income of residents. Consumers receive
an expected return on their assets where is the average tax rate.
Assuming that real returns are taxed, the effective expected nominal rate is
where Rnt is the nominal interest rate and Pt=(Pt-Pt-1)/Pt-1 is the
inflation rate.
The individual consumer born in period s maximises (2.1) given her budget
constraint, the tax structure and rational expectations of for the nominal and real
interest rate. Let ‘total’ consumption including and excluding foregone expected
interest payments on money balances be denoted by and respectively.
Carrying out the individuals’s optimisation problem and aggregating over the all





where Vt=Mt/Pt+Dt+Ft+Kt is aggregate non-human end-of-period wealth and
is the relative price of foreign to domestic output.
2 In (2.3), C
e
t+1,t denotes
rational expectations of Ct+1 formed at time t. Under perfect foresight C
e
t+1,t=Ct+1 in
equilibrium, but we retain the expectational superscript to emphasize that Ct is a
forward-looking ’jump’ variable. The expected or ex ante real interest rate
differs from the ex post real interest rate (Rt), appearing in the budget
2This is the discrete time analogue of a result derived in Blanchard (1985) with
added tax distortions. Second order terms in p,q, R, g and n have been ignored.
4identities, an important distinction when we consider credibility.






t-EtImt is the trade balance, Imt is investment out of imported
goods and Im
*
t is overseas investment out of domestic output. Throughout the paper,
starred variables such as C
*
mt refer to the ’foreign’ country. Government debt
accumulation is given by the government budget identity introduced in section 3.
Firms and Labour Market
Aggregate output is assumed to be given by a Cobb-Douglas production
function
(2.7)
where Kdt (Kmt) is end-of-period capital stock accumulated out of domestic (foreign)
output At=A0(1+µ)
t represents Harrod-neutral technical change where µ is the
productivity growth rate. In the steady-state, the GDP growth rate is n=µ+g where
g is employment growth. Employment is in effect determined by unions who set the
nominal wage to achieve a desired employment target over the a one-period
contract, based upon expectations Pt and given the firms’ demand for labour
function.
The representative firm’s optimisation problem at time t is to choose an
investment plan {Idt} and {Imt} out of domestic and foreign output respectively to
maximise:
(2.8)
where defines lt+i and Wrt is the real wage, subject
to ; (2.9)
where d is the depreciation rate which is assumed to be equal for the two types of
capital. In carrying out this optimisation problem the firm takes the real interest rate
{Rt}, the real wage {Wrt}, the labour supply {Lt} equal to { } and the relative
5price {Et} over the planning period as given. Then the first order conditions for
profit-maximisation are:
; (2.10)
Thus the capital-output ratios for the two types of capital are negatively related to
the user cost of capital which includes depreciation; for imported capital the user
cost must include the expected capital gains following a real exchange rate
depreciation. We assume that profits and the opportunity cost of capital are taxed
at the same rate. Then provided that profits are taxed net of depreciation costs,
taxation does not affect the investment decisions of the firm and (2.10) still applies.
Turning to the labour market, the nominal wage is chosen in period t-1
to achieve the employment target given expectations of . Then in period t,
given Kdt-1,
Kmt-1 and Wnt, actual employment satisfies the first order condition for profit-
maximisation:
(2.11)
given the current observed price level Pt. It follows that the desired employment
satisfies
(2.12)
Ct,( ) aggregate consumption including (excluding) foregone interest
payments
Cdt,( C mt) aggregate real consumption of domestic (imported) goods
Rnt nominal interest rate
Pt=1-Pt-1/Pt inflation rate over period [t-1,t], where Pt=price level
Rt=Rnt-Pt+1,t expected real interest rate over period [t,t+1]
Et=Pt
*/Pt relative price of foreign to domestic output
Mt end-of-period money balances
Dt end-of-period non-indexed real government debt
Kt end-of-period capital stock
Kdt,K mt end-of-period domestic, imported capital stock
6Idt,I mt domestic, imported investment goods
Ft net overseas assets
Vt total consumer real wealth
Tt,( ) total taxation (the tax rate)
Gt exhaustive government spending
Qt primary deficit including seigniorage receipts
Yt real output
Lt employment
Wnt,W rt nominal wage and real wage
f proportion of indexed wage contracts
Bt trade balance
g population growth
p probability of death
q consumers’ rate of time preference
n=µ+g long-run GDP growth, where µ is productivity growth
d depreciation rate of capital
Table 2.1. Summary of Notation.
The general notation is: (for GDP ratios). Lower case variables, such as
yt in table 4.1, are proportional deviations about the trend, (e.g. )
where is the trend, and absolute deviations (e.g., where is the
long-run value of ) which are used for per GDP ratios, the inflation rate and
interest rates.
Hence from (2.11) and (2.12) we have . If a proportion f of




t,P t , and expectational variables, (2.13) then determine
employment Lt. This completes the supply-side. Equating demand and supply and
using the definition of the trade balance Bt after (2.6) then gives the following
output market equilibrium condition
7(2.14)
Market Structure Within The Monetary Union: Models MU1 and MU2
Up to now we have assumed that monetary union will leave the two countries
producing distinct goods. For this case, referred to as MU2, the dynamics of the
relative price, Et=P
*
t/Pt, are given by
(2.15)
Analogous equations for the foreign country then completes the model of a two-
country, two-good monetary union. Now suppose that economic integration within
the monetary union results in the two economies producing an identical product. We





be total consumption, excluding foregone interest payments on holdings of real
money balances, as before. Then , which replaces Cdt and Cmt in (2.5),
with total consumption (including foregone interest payments) Ct still given by (2.3).
Then
(2.16)
describes output equilibrium. Aggregate demand can exceed aggregate supply
leading to ’trade balances’ given by . Otherwise model MU1 is
as MU2.
Calibration
Dynamic games based on models with structural dynamics almost inevitably
lead to solutions which are analytically intractable. Our model is quite rich in detail
and analysis is only possible at most in the steady-state for ad hoc forms of
government behaviour. By contrast, the dynamic game equilibria concepts employed
in this paper are not analytically tractable and require numerical solutions. ’Deep’
parameter values are chosen by first, solving for the steady-state given baseline
values for fiscal and monetary instruments and second, calibrating the steady-state
8values of selected readily observed variables of the model to observed data.
3 There
are of course many ways of doing this; in our calibration the observed variables and
their values are chosen to be: n=P=0.03, =2.5, R=0.05, =0.2, =0.5, b=0.25.
Then , q, d, and can be determined endogenously. Table 2.2
summarises the details of the calibration and include the steady-state properties used.
Observed Variable Value Source
0.03 OECD n P ˜ M
0.05 OECD R
2.50 OECD ˜ K








Derived Parameter Value Equation
µ 0.025






Table 2.2 Details of the Calibration.
Source: OECD (1993) average of France, Germany, Italy and the UK.
Understanding the Model: Fiscal Expansion in One Country
3 This corresponds to the approach of Shoven and Whalley (1992).
9In the model described there are three forms of fiscal spillovers. The first is
that one country’s public sector deficit or public expenditure or distortionary
taxation can all exert permanent upward pressure on real interest rates and crowd
out community-wide investment. This is in a sense a free-rider problem which only
exists in a non-Ricardian world. The second externality is beggar-thy-neighbour in
character and arises in the case of MU2 where each country specialises in the
production of its own ’home’ good. Then an improvement in either country’s terms
of trade can be engineered by a unilateral fiscal expansion. The third externality
arises from labour market distortions. If the central bank cannot achieve credible
inflation targets, then both countries can experience an increase in output from a
surprise fiscal expansion in either country which causes global surprise inflation.
In order to understand these spillovers it is instructive to first consider some
ad hoc policy changes on the calibrated model. Consider a 1% change in the
government spending/GDP ratio relative to the steady-state (i.e., %) for the
domestic country keeping the same ratio for the foreign country constant (i.e.,
). For the ad hoc policy exercises of this section we introduce the following
stabilisation rules, assumed to be credible, for taxes and the nominal interest rate:
(2.18)
where t>R-n is chosen to ensure government solvency. According to the interest
rate rule in (2.18) the CB responds to an increase in inflation by increasing the real
interest rate.
Figure 1 displays the trajectories for consumption, investment, government
spending and the trade balance as proportions of GDP ( and respectively),
inflation (p) and the nominal interest rate (rn) under MU1 and MU2. From the
trajectories for consumption, investment, the trade balance and government spending
shares it can be seen that fiscal expansion in the domestic country (an increase in
and ) crowds out its consumption, exports and, after one year, investment. In the
very short term inflation rises above the nominal interest rate, real interest rates fall
10and investment rises. However, the rule (2.18) ensures that the real interest rate
quickly rises, crowding out investment. Households in the foreign country increase
their savings ratio and acquire more overseas assets. In a rational expectations
equilibrium, an inflation surprise can only take place in the first period when p
e
t is
predetermined and set at zero. Output thus rises sharply at first but eventually falls
as the capital stock falls in response to a rise in the real interest rate.
For the case of MU2, inflation rises in the foreign country and quickly
converges to that of the domestic country. The main difference is that an
improvement in the domestic terms of trade (a fall in E) occurs. This makes
imported consumption goods cheaper for households in the domestic country and
their welfare improves. In addition imported capital is cheaper bringing further
supply-side gains. A fiscal expansion in the domestic country imposes considerable
external costs on the foreign country because of a contraction of world savings, a
higher real interest rate, a deterioration in the terms of trade (for the foreign country)
and higher inflation. This externality is important for understanding the later
simulation results for the two-good non-cooperative game.
4
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
3. THE MONETARY UNION POLICY GAME.
In our two-country model the monetary union policy game has three players -
the two fiscal authorities and the CB. We consider these in turn.
The Fiscal Authorities.
The instruments of the fiscal authorities are the tax rate and government
spending chosen subject to a budget constraint. To derive the latter we assume a
simple distributional formula in which the total seigniorage accruing to the CB is
distributed equally to each country in the form of fiscal transfers. Then the primary
deficit of the domestic authority is
4 The simulation model is available on request from the authors in the form of
an executable program with facilities to change parameters and the rule (2.18).
11(3.1)
where the last term are the seigniorage receipts. The government budget identity is
then:
(3.2)
in per GDP form where nt is the GDP growth rate over the interval [t,t+1]. Define
the growth-adjusted real interest rate over the interval [t,t+1] by .
Then solving (3.2) forward in time the budget identity becomes the solvency
constraint:
(3.3)
provided that the tranversality condition holds - that is, in the long run grows at
a rate less than . In (3.3) we assume that eventually rt>0. This is a feature of the
consumption/savings model in section 2 and rules out ’dynamic inefficiency’.
According to (3.3) a government in debt with >0 must, sometime in the future,
run primary surpluses to be solvent. Notice that solvency does not require a stable
debt/GDP ratio but merely that, in the long run, it does not increase faster than
the growth adjusted real interest rate. However in a world with even very small
departures from perfectly functioning capital markets, the notion of unbounded
government debt/GDP ratios does not appeal. A stronger concept of solvency -
adopted in this paper - is that debt/GDP ratios stabilise in the long run.
5
Following Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) we measure social welfare in terms of
total private and public consumption aggregated over all consumers of different
ages. The fiscal authority in the domestic country chooses paths for spending and
taxes to maximise a national welfare function of the form
(3.4)
Direct externalities in government spending are ignored. (See, however, Levine and
Brociner (1994) for an assessment of these externalities). (3.4) differs from an
5 Buiter and Patel (1990) provide an interesting discussion of this distinction.
12aggregate welfare function based on (2.1) in that demand for money in the utility
function is replaced by a more general term capturing inflation costs and we include
a quadratic term that penalises high taxation capturing the costs of collection. The
final term in (3.4), penalising a high government debt/GDP ratio is introduced to
ensure solvency. In fact a small value for g6 is sufficient for this purpose.
A consequence of using a welfare criteria of the form (3.4) is that it embodies
the policymaker’s desired distribution across present and future generations and is
dependent upon the authorities’ discount factor. Coordination is required for two
identical countries to achieve their desired distribution and the lack of coordination
causes pecuniary externalities, i.e., externalities which work through the price
mechanism. Both the public debt and the real exchange rate externalities are
pecuniary. They give rise to Pareto-inefficiency with respect to our chosen social
welfare criteria, but not with respect to individual household utilities across different
generations. The existence of labour market imperfections and distortionary taxes
also result in technological externalities and here decentralised fiscal policy has




The CB is concerned with the global economy and chooses its instrument,
the nominal interest rate, to maximise a global welfare function of the form
7
6 See Buiter and Kletzer (1991).
7In the dynamic game equilibria set out in the Appendix we use a linearised
model and a Taylor series quadratic approximation to (3.4) and (3.5), around the
baseline steady-state, with bliss points ; ; in
deviation form. i.e., actual bliss values of inflation, taxation and government debt
are zero.
13(3.5)
Thus except for the following differences: the CB is more ’conservative’





In the first set of results the CB is not responsible for ensuring the solvency of the







given small values to guarantee solvency.
8 In a further exercise we consider the
effects of a ’weak’ CB which concerns itself with global solvency, puts and g
CB
6 >0
hence monetises the debt. This corresponds to the Sargent-Wallace ’unpleasant
monetary arithmetic’.
Reputation and Cooperation
The credibility of policies and the associated problem of time inconsistency
is a major issue in the debate over EMU. In our model time inconsistency originates
from three sources. First, it arises from the optimal choice of consumption, savings
and demand for money by each household where taxes are distortionary (see, for
example, Lucas and Stokey (1983)). The second source of time inconsistency is that
treasuries issue nominal rather than indexed bonds and as a consequence there arises
an incentive to erode the debt/GDP ratio by engaging in surprise inflation. Thirdly,
there exists the familiar role for surprise inflation in the labour market.
Given these features of the model (and rational expectations) we can
distinguish between the cases when an authority has or does not have a reputation
for precommitment. A fiscal or monetary authority which enjoys reputation can
exercise the greatest leverage over the private sector because an announced path of
instrument settings would be credible and would affect private sector behaviour
8Chosen parameter values are: (identical governments); ;
(the latter assumes that the observed government spending/private consumption
ratios correspond to household preferences), , , and .
14immediately in the desired way. For instance the announcement of lower
government spending and taxes in the future will immediately raise consumption.
But how relevant are reputational (time inconsistent) regimes? A large of volume
literature now exists on how a time inconsistent policy may be enforced despite the
incentive to renege. Mechanisms suggested include constitutional constraints
(Kydland and Prescott (1977)) and ’punishment strategies’ on the part of the private
sector (Barro and Gordon (1983); Levine and Currie (1987)). There are a number
of problems with the latter not least of which how atomistic economic agents might
coordinate on the precise punishment scheme that supports a particular reputational
equilibrium.
9
When a government cannot precommit itself to a future policy, it must act
each period to maximise its welfare function, given that a similar optimisation
problem will be carried out in the next period. Formally, the policymaker maximises
at time t a welfare function Ut
(2.4)
where ut is the single-period welfare, l is the discount factor and Ut is evaluated on
the assumption that an identical optimisation exercise is carried out from time t+1
onwards. The solution to this problem is found by dynamic programming and,
unlike the reputational policy, leads to a time consistent trajectory or rule for
instruments. Details of all the solution concepts are to be found in the Appendix and
in Currie and Levine (1993), Chapter 6.
With this distinction between reputational and non-reputational policies in
mind we now return to the question of cooperation. The socially optimal policy is
for the CB and national governments to agree on a global welfare function and to
be able to precommit in their joint choice of all policy instruments in its
maximisation. The global welfare function under full cooperation is assumed to be
9 See al-Nowaihi and Levine (1993) for a discussion of this problem.
15thus giving the CB the same bargaining power as the two combined national
governments. We call this regime CR (cooperation with reputation) and we use it
as a benchmark against more realistic regimes.
Suppose that both the CB and the fiscal authorities lack a reputation for
precommitment to the private sector. This leaves three possibilities. The first is
where the CB is not independent and monetary and fiscal policies are fully
coordinated without reputation. This is regime CNR (cooperation without
reputation). The second possibility is with an independent CB and uncoordinated
fiscal policies. This is the non-cooperative equilibrium in the three-player game,
NCNR (non-cooperation with no reputation). We also consider an intermediate
regime where fiscal authorities alone cooperate but the CB remains independent.
This is in effect a two-player non-cooperative equilibrium which we refer to as
NCNRF (non-cooperation between fiscal and monetary authorities but fiscal
cooperation). Under NCNRF we assume the fiscal authorities jointly maximise
.
Since we have adopted identical objectives and model structures for the two
countries, the relative price of the two goods under MU2 remain at their initial
equilibrium values. Consequently the equilibria of CR, CNR and NCNRF,
involving fiscal cooperation, are the same for MU1 and MU2. However, for NCNR,
each national government perceives a welfare gain from improving its terms of trade
and so the equilibria, denoted by NCNR1 and NCNR2, differ under MU1 and MU2.
This leaves us five regimes summarised in Table 3.1.





CNR NCNRF NCNR1 (MU1)
NCNR2 (MU2)
Table 3.1 Summary of the Five Regimes.
164. SIMULATION RESULTS
No Monetisation of Debt by the CB
In our first set of results the CB plays no part in ensuring the solvency of the
fiscal authorities. Thus whereas must be given a small value to guarantee
strong solvency in the two countries. The long-run equilibria of the five regimes are
given in table 4.1 relative to the original baseline steady-state about which all
variables are measured. In order to explain the nature of the time inconsistency of
regime CR, the trajectories of CR and CNR are compared in figure 2. Consider first
regime CR. According to table 4.1, CR involves a long-run lowering of the
government spending/GDP ( ) and the debt/GDP ( ) ratios. In our non-Ricardian
economies this must result in a long-run fall in the real interest rate. Investment is
crowded in and output rises.
The dynamic paths that lead to this long-run for CR are shown in figure 3.
There is an immediate increase in government spending and taxation, the latter
dominating so that the debt/GDP ratio falls towards its desired value . In the
long-run this drop in government debt allows for a fall in the primary surplus and
the taxation/GDP ratio falls by more than the government spending/GDP ratio,
reducing tax distortions. Inflation increases sharply in the first period by around 3%
contributing to the erosion of government debt and output rises in response to this
once-and-for-all surprise. Thereafter inflation drops to its desired level of -3%
(relative to a baseline of 3% implying an actual zero value of inflation)
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
A promise of a long-run fall in taxation coupled with an immediate increase
is the initially optimal policy for reducing the distortionary effects of taxation on
consumption, savings and the real interest rate, consistent with the government
budget constraint. But this policy is time inconsistent. Similarly an immediate
increase in inflation followed by a permanent fall is also time inconsistent. Loosely
speaking the initial settings of instruments under CR are the values the combined
17fiscal and monetary authority would return to at any time after t>0. Under CNR the
private sector anticipates re-optimisation and the initial rise in observed under CR
continues indefinitely. Inflation also remains persistently high and provides an extra
source of seigniorage permitting the tax ratio to rise by less than .
REGIME p r y U
F
CR -0.4 -1.3 2.3 -3.0 -41 -0.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 44
CNR 1.4 0.5 -2.4 3.3 -41 -0.05 0.2 0.1 -1.5 28
NCNR1 12.5 12.7 -1.9 1.3 -15 0.9 -3.7 -2.1 -10.4 -281
NCNR2 16.4 16.7 -2.3 1.4 -16 1.2 -4.9 -2.9 -13.5 -474
NCNRF 20.7 21.0 -2.7 1.6 -24 1.4 -6.2 -3.6 -17.1 -608
Table 4.1. Long-Run Equilibria of the Regimes See table 2.1 for notation.
Now consider the non-cooperative regime NCNR1 under MU1. The first point
to notice about all the non-cooperative regimes is that the independence of the CB,
which places a priority on lowering inflation, ensures that inflation is less compared
with CNR where the CB has to compromise over its objective function. However,
this gain in terms of lower inflation is bought at a price. The CB fixes the nominal
interest rate. Given the nominal interest rate rule, the fiscal authorities can increase
inflation through a fiscal expansion in the form of an approximately balanced budget
increase in the ratio . This was clearly seen in our earlier simulations of ad hoc
rules. These inflation increases are perceived by the fiscal authorities as surprises
which increase output and reduce the real value of debt offering a nominal return.
In a rational expectations equilibrium of course these benefits do not materialise, as
inflation is anticipated, and the resulting equilibrium is one where there is simply
an upward bias in government spending .
The inefficient outcome is the result of a conflict between fiscal authorities
who attempt to engineer surprise inflation by raising and a conservative CB who
respond by raising nominal and hence real interest rates to squeeze out inflation.
Going back to table 4.2, if fiscal authorities alone cooperate (regime NCNRF) then
18their incentive to inflate increases because the combined fiscal expansion has a
greater impact on the common inflation rate. The result is that the upward bias in
government spending worsens. Thus with an independent CB setting the nominal
interest rate, fiscal policy coordination is counterproductive.
10 The fiscal
externality arising from each country’s public sector deficit or government spending
or distortionary taxation can only be successfully internalised if fiscal coordination
is accompanied by fiscal and monetary policy coordination, preferably with
reputation (regime CR), but also without reputation (regime CNR).
g
CB
4 p r y U
F
5 10.5 10.9 -19.0 25.3 12.0 0.8 -3.2 -2.0 -8.5 -313
10 11.7 12.2 -8.4 10.4 2.3 0.9 -3.6 -2.1 -9.6 -292
30 12.5 12.7 -1.9 1.3 -15 0.9 -3.7 -2.1 -10.4 -281
100 12.8 12.8 0.8 -1.7 -26.9 0.9 -3.7 -2.1 -10.7 -227
Table 4.2. The Effect of Conservative Bankers: Regime NCNR1 (1-good)
Table 4.2 shows the effect of changing the degree of conservatism of the CB.
Inflation falls but the upward bias in government spending rises. The last column
of the table shows that the positive welfare effects of the former outweigh the
negative effects of the latter so that increasing the degree of conservatism is welfare-
enhancing. Notice that a more conservative CB results in a lower steady-state
debt/GDP ratio . The reason for this is that the fiscal authorities offset the rise in
the real interest rate, resulting from the tightening of monetary policy by an
increasingly conservative CB, by raising taxation sufficiently to lower The
combined effect is to leave the real interest rate almost unchanged.
Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic
We now relax the earlier assumption that solvency is the sole concern of the
fiscal authorities and examine a scenario in the spirit of Sargent and Wallace. In
10 This provides a fiscal analogy to the well-known result by Rogoff(1985a) that
monetary policy coordination can be counterproductive.
19table 4.3 the CB concerns itself with rising debt/GDP ratio in the two countries by





is set at a small value just sufficient to ensure strong solvency. Experiments lead
to the adoption . The effect of forcing the CB to share responsibility for g
F
6 0.1





significantly and debt/GDP ratios (and with them the real interest rate) rise
substantially.
p r y U
F
0 12.5 12.7 -1.9 1.3 -15 0.9 -3.7 -2.1 -10.4 -281
1 12.2 13.3 -2.4 1.9 28 1.0 -4.3 -2.5 -9.7 -335
2 12.1 14.8 -3.2 4.0 100 1.2 -5.3 -3.1 -9.0 -416
3 11.8 18.9 -6.9 7.1 307 2.0 -8.4 -5.0 -6.8 -632
Table 4.3. Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic: Regime NCNR1 (1-good);
Credible Inflation Targeting
The inefficiency of the non-cooperative regimes arises, in part, from the
conflict between the fiscal authorities who perceive of benefits from surprise
inflation originating from their own expansionary policies, and the CB who respond
by tightening monetary policy. We now examine the extent to which this may be
due to the choice of monetary instrument - the nominal interest rate.
11 It is well-
known from oligopoly theory that the choice of instrument can crucially affect the
nature of a Nash equilibrium. In an oligopoly, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for
which output is the decision variable is totally different from the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium for which prices are the instruments. An analogous result holds in our
11 See also Levine (1993) for an analogous analytical result using a much
simpler model with an IS/LM demand side.
20monetary-fiscal policy game.
Suppose that the CB sets credible inflation targets to be achieved by
appropriate monetary instruments. The precise nature of these instruments do not
concern us. What is important are the perceptions of each player in the Nash
equilibrium. As long as the private sector and the fiscal authorities believe that
inflation is low and, in the case of the latter, beyond their control we may put
and fiscal authorities will no longer attempt to engage in surprise inflation.
The remaining externalities are the ’purely fiscal’ ones discussed in the introduction.
Their effect on the non-cooperative outcome of what is now a two-player game can
be seen in table 4.4. The main result is that there is now a welfare case for fiscal
policy coordination with an independent CB, especially in a two-good world where
the terms of trade externality exists. But these gains are far less than those from full
fiscal and monetary policy coordination reported before with the nominal interest
rate as the instrument.
REGIM
E
p r y U
F
CR -0.4 -1.3 2.3 -3.0 -41 -0.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 32
CNR 1.9 1.5 2.3 -3.0 -2.6 0.05 -0.2 -0.2 -1.7 24
NCNR
1
4.3 3.6 2.3 -3.0 -41 0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -3.9 6
NCNR
2
10.8 10.2 2.3 -3.0 -46 0.6 -2.7 -1.7 -9.1 -141
Table 4.4 Credible Inflation Targets.
5. CONCLUSIONS.
The paper has emphasised the distinction between the purely fiscal reasons
for fiscal policy coordination given a credible low-inflation policy by the CB and
the spillover effects of an uncoordinated fiscal policy on monetary policy. Our worst
scenario (table 4.3), ’the unpleasant monetary arithmetic’, is where an independent
CB sets the common nominal interest rate and responds to a rising government
debt/GDP ratio in either of the two countries with a looser monetary stance - in
21effect monetising the debt. This results in high inflation, high debt/GDP ratios and
an excessively large public sector.
Our intermediate scenario (table 4.2), ’no monetisation of debt by the CB’,
is one where the CB sets the nominal interest rate and fiscal authorities bear sole
responsibility for their own solvency. The result is again excessively large public
sector spending; but government debt is contained and inflation kept low. For these
first two scenarios fiscal policy coordination with an independent CB is
counterproductive because it increases the incentive for fiscal authorities to engage
in surprise inflation.
The best scenario (table 4.4) occurs with credible inflation targeting by the
CB. This removes the incentive for the fiscal authorities to cause surprise inflation.
There are now welfare gains from fiscal coordination with an independent CB, but
these are only substantial in a two-good world where there exists an incentive to
attempt beggar-thy-neighbour improvements in the terms of trade by fiscal
expansion.
There are number of directions for future research. We have arbitrarily
imposed various degrees of conservatism on the CB whereas the type of banker can
be seen as a strategic variable chosen optimally in a ’delegation game’. Stabilisation
policy is absent in our deterministic model, but the choice of conservative banker
should balance the gains of lower average inflation against a less effective monetary
stabilisation rule (Rogoff, 1985b). Another development would be the re-
examination of the fiscal-monetary policy games in the context of an endogenous
growth model, drawing upon the recent vast literature in this area.
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APPENDIX. Dynamic Game Solution Concepts.
The model in linearised form has the following state-space representation:
(B1)
say, where zt is an (n - m) x 1 vector of predetermined variables, xt i sa nmx1
vector of non-predetermined variables, x
e
t+1,t denotes rational expectations of xt+1
formed at time t on the basis knowledge of the model (B1), wt and w
*
t are 2x1
vectors of fiscal instruments. All capital letters (such as A and B above) indicate
matrices. The initial conditions at t=0 are given by z0. All time-varying variables are
measured as proportional or absolute deviations from the baseline steady-state (see
the general notation defined after table 2.1).
A quadratic approximation to a welfare loss (minus the utility) associated





2. This uses a Taylor series expansion:
where . Then are targets set at
100% above the baseline. Other targets are set at ; thus the
domestic fiscal authority’s welfare loss can be written in the general form:
24(B2)
at time t=0, where superscript T denotes the transform. A analogous welfare loss can
be written for the second fiscal authority, the CB and the economies as a whole.
Regime CR.
Under CR the three players cooperate and are able to precommit. A joint
welfare loss of the form (B2) is chosen and minimised, at time t=0, with respect to
fiscal and monetary instruments . By the standard theory of Lagrangian
multipliers, a function
is defined where pt is a vector of costate variables. L0 is then minimised with respect
to all state and costate variables and the instruments. Partitioning
conformably with gives a solution for the economy under control of the form
; (B3)
Boundary conditions: complete the solution. (B3) gives the
feedback form of the cooperative, optimal policy. Partitioning H conformably with
zt and p2t so that H21 and H22 are mx(n-m) and mxm respectively, p2t+1=H21zt+H22p2t,
Then (B3) becomes
(B4)
where G=[G1G2], partitioned conformably with zt and p2t. The rule then consists of
a feedback on the lagged predetermined variables extending back to time t=0, the
time of the formulation and announcement of the policy, with geometrically
declining weights.







The precommitment solution takes the feedback form of a rule (B3) which,
as we have seen from (B4) is a rule with memory. The time-inconsistency of this
equilibrium can be best seen by examining the ’cost-to-go’ (B5). Re-optimisation
25at time t, and reneging on the commitment given at time 0, then involves putting
. Thus the gains from reneging are . It can be shown that
(i.e., negative definite) and it follows that everywhere along the optimal
trajectory at which , there will be gains from reneging and the ex ante optimal
policy is sub-optimal ex post.
In order to construct a time-consistent policy we employ dynamic
programming and seek a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which instruments are still
allowed to depend on past history, but only through a feedback on the current value
of the state variables. This precludes a feedback as in (B3) which involves memory.
Thus we seek a stationary solution in which Wt is minimised at time t
subject to the model (B1) in the knowledge that an identical procedure will be used
to minimise Wt+1 at time t+1. Other features of the solution are that , which
we know is true of saddlepath stable solutions to rational expectations models under
a rule , and that where S is a ’Riccati’ matrix. Regimes NCNR
and NCNRF.
These are closed-loop Nash equilibria found by iterating between the
policymakers and the private sector in a Cournot-like adjustment process. Then,
given initial values for G, G
* and N, defined as in the regime CNR above, we arrive
at the equilibria NCNR (a game with policymakers) or NCNRF (2 policymakers).
12
Figure 1. Fiscal Expansion in Country 1. =1%.
MU1 MU2
12 The software used to compute the equilibria is described Gaines and Levine
(1989). Full details of the solution procedures are in Currie and Levine (1993),
chapter 6.
26Figure 2. Trajectories for Regimes CR and CNR
CR CNR
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